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Abstract: 
The reproduction of the human form has been a universal practice amongst human ecologies 
for millennia.  Over the past 200 years, popular culture has considered the imaginary 
consequences of the danger to humanity and human-ness of replicating the autonomous 
human form too faithfully.  Today, the seductive allure of technologically advanced 
simulated human bodies and advances in robotics and artificial intelligence has brought us 
closer to facing this possibility.  Alongside the simultaneous aversion and fascination of the 
possibility that autonomous simulated human forms may become indistinguishable from 
human beings is the deep-rooted uncanniness of the automaton in its strange familiarity – not 
only to ourselves, but to our pleasant childhood imaginings of playing with dolls.  As such, 
simulated human bodies are often enrolled in medical and nursing education models with the 
assumption that making the simulation teaching spaces seem as close to clinical spaces as 
possible will allow students to practise potentially harmful clinical skills without causing any 
harm to human patients.  However similar the simulated human bodies may appear to a 
living, breathing human, a tension between the embodiment of particularly human attributes 
and their replication persists.  How can computerized simulated human patients be enrolled to 
teach people to develop the necessary attributes of compassion and empathy when caring for 
human beings?  This paper explores the uncanny ecologies of simulated human patients in 
nursing education by presenting a posthuman analysis of the practices of nurse educators as 
they enrol these digital objects in their teaching.  Guided by a selection of heuristics offered 
as a mode of interviewing digital objects, the analysis enrolled gathering anecdotes and 
unravelling translations to attune to the ways in which these uncanny posthuman 
assemblages become powerful modes of knowing to mobilize learning about human 
attributes within uncanny posthuman ecologies.  
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You enter a room in a hospital ward.  It is equipped with all of the objects familiar to 
a hospital room – a bed, some equipment trolleys on castor wheels, a bedside table, a 
blue vinyl arm chair, an IV stand, an angle-poise lamp mounted above the bed, and a 
variety of hoses, tubes, wires, and other instruments attached to a panel on the wall 
at the head of the bed.  You approach the bed.  A body lies on its back in the bed, 
partly covered with a sheet and a lightweight blue cotton blanket pulled up to the 
chin.  The body’s bare feet are sticking out of the bottom of the blanket.  On the sole 
of the left foot, you can see the words ‘HOSPITAL PROPERTY’ written in black 
ball-point pen letters.  A monitor, mounted on a shelf beside the bed, displays 
multiple patterns, flashing green, yellow, red, and blue.  The hospital bed is inclined 
slightly, so that the body’s head tilts upwards, facing towards the ceiling.  The eyes 
and mouth are open, and a row of white teeth is visible through thin, colourless lips.  
The body is still – too still, it seems – but you can hear it breathing.  You notice then 
that the chest is rising and falling gently with the breaths.  The eyes blink, making a 
soft clicking sound.  It sounds very similar to the sound made by a doll your sister 
had when you were young – when it was placed on its back, the doll closed its eyes.  
You remember the hard plastic of its eyelashes and how they felt when you pushed 
them with your finger.  There is something disturbing about this body; something 
strange, yet something familiar.   
In the ‘future-noir’ film, Blade Runner (Scott 1982), set in future Los Angeles in 2019, the 
technology for the simulation of human beings is so sophisticated that it is nearly impossible 
to distinguish them from real humans.  The only human attribute lacking in these simulated 
humans, or replicants, as they are called, is the capacity for empathy.  Designed purely to 
serve humans, the replicants are exiled to work on other, distant, worlds, and are forbidden 
access to Earth.  If they do escape from these ‘off-worlds’ and arrive on Earth, the only way 
they can be distinguished from humans is by giving them an empathy test to determine 
whether they are devoid of compassion; a psychometric questionnaire/video camera hybrid 
machine, with the examiner, or Blade Runner, narrating a selection of anecdotes to test the 
emotional response of the subject: the ‘capillary dilation of the so-called blush response.  
Fluctuation of the pupil.  Involuntary dilation of the iris’, or ‘Voight-Kampff for short’ 
(which sounds uncannily like ‘void-comp’ on the soundtrack) (Scott 1982).  In the film, Rick 
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Deckard is the Blade Runner whose job it is to perform these tests, and to hunt down and 
‘retire’ the replicants who are living illegally on Earth.  As an exemplar of the complex 
matrix of human compulsion and aversion to engineering digital duplicates of ourselves, the 
film opens up possibilities for exploring our own humanity by (re)presenting the 
entanglement of human and nonhuman in considering what it means to be human, and what it 
might mean for simulated humans to appear to be more human than human – the motto of the 
company that manufactures the replicants.  This paper offers a posthuman inquiry of a similar 
object by presenting the analysis of an interview with a high-fidelity computerized simulated 
human patient. 
Inspired by Adams and Thompson’s (2016) writings on posthuman inquiry, this paper draws 
on their guidance for interviewing digital objects to explore the tension that dwells within the 
uncanny mediations that are enacted in the human/simulated human hybrid world of 
computerized simulated human patients in nursing education.  Specifically, I enrol the 
heuristic of gathering anecdotes to ‘[d]escribe how the object or thing appeared, showed up, 
or was given in professional practice’ (Adams and Thompson 2016: 24).  In addition, I enrol 
the heuristic of unravelling translations to explore the multiple assemblages – or realities – of 
these simulation pedagogies by becoming attuned to ‘the tensions in coexisting networks’ 
(Adams and Thompson 2016: 80) to reveal how partially connected worlds assemble to 
disrupt practices and enact multiple realities. 
Focusing on the development of the skill, or attribute, of empathy, and following these 
heuristics (Adams and Thompson 2016), the posthuman anecdotes presented here were 
gathered while undertaking a praxiographic (Mol 2002) research project, informed by actor-
network theory, as part of my doctoral studies (Ireland, 2019).  A praxiography (Mol 2002) 
enrols the techniques of ethnographic observations to explore the practicalities of the way 
reality is enacted by persistently attending to the relevance of the materialities and ‘always 
including them in stories about physicalities’ (Mol 2002: 31).  My research explored the ways 
in which nurse educators enrolled digital objects, in particular, high-fidelity simulated human 
patients, to teach immediate life support skills to undergraduate nursing students.  
Praxiographic (Mol 2002) observations were made at two nursing schools, based in the UK, 
over one semester in each, with a cohort of third-year nursing students who were nearing the 
end of their degree programme.  The observations focused on the teaching practices of two 
nurse educators who routinely used digital objects such as computerized simulated humans in 
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their teaching practices; one educator in each school.  Here I will focus on the simulated 
human patient as the digital object, choosing a selection of anecdotes drawn from these 
observations and analysed by considering the interview questions supporting Adams and 
Thompson’s ‘Heuristic 7: Unravelling Translations’ (Adams and Thompson 2016: 74).  In 
particular, the questions relating to Mol’s (2002) notion of multiple realities will be 
considered: 
How do different sociomaterial worlds come to be?  What objects and/or 
practices work to connect or distance these different worlds?  How do these 
acts serve to join up or disrupt practices? (Adams and Thompson 2016: 75) 
So, what are these digital objects that connect or distance different worlds?  Computerized 
simulated human patients are life-size mannequins capable of simulating such human 
physiological characteristics such as pulse, breathing, and blinking.  Some are designed to 
train obstetricians and midwives and can simulate childbirth.  Others are mechanically 
animated to mimic facial expressions in paediatric patients to indicate pain, fear, anxiety, and 
distress.  However, most of these mannequins are used in medical and nursing simulation 
education and serve to enact the role of the patient in any given learning scenario.  Because 
their purpose is mostly to teach about the skills necessary to support human life, they are 
equipped with functions that imitate the basic human signs of life: the chest rises and falls, 
and air is drawn in and out of the nose and mouth by means of a compressor; they simulate 
pulse at multiple sites around the body by means of a mechanical movement underneath their 
latex skin; their eyes blink and their pupils react to light, and some can be programmed for 
the eyes to follow a visual stimulus in the form of a digital automatic object tracking that 
interacts with the mannequin’s irises.  They are connected wirelessly to software algorithms, 
pre-programmed to generate numbers and graphs to specify the relevant vital signs, such as 
heart rate, blood pressure, and the levels of oxygen saturation in the blood, appropriate to any 
given condition within the simulation scenario.  They are also equipped with speakers to 
simulate the patient’s voice, which can either be pre-recorded or enacted by an educator, and 
there are now multiple additional adaptations that can be made to suit many different learning 




Figure 1: The high-fidelity simulated human patient – SimManTM 
The main purpose of employing these digital technologies as a pedagogical tool is the 
underlying assumption that learning life-saving skills is best practised in a simulation 
environment – where scenarios can be rehearsed repeatedly until these skills are learned, 
without harming human beings (Berragan 2011).  While the mannequins resemble the human 
form, they might also embody an idealized double of a human patient: they can take on the 
role of any patient in any situation, yet, at the same time, they do so in an uncanny way, 
(re)presenting an unsubstantial embodiment, a ghostly or spectral form.  As such, we might 
consider them eidolons (OED 2019).  These eidolons, similar to the replicants of Blade 
Runner, are also incapable of simulating the human attribute of empathy – they are devoid of 
compassion.  If they are seemingly incapable of embodying empathy, how do these digital 
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objects participate in the mobilization of knowledge to teach nursing students how to enrol 
empathy and compassion in their practices?  
Empathy for eidolons – an elusive skill that cannot be taught? 
Compassion can be defined as ‘sympathetic pity and concern for the suffering and misfortune 
of others’, while empathy is ‘the ability to understand and share the feelings of another’ 
(OED 2019).  Understood in this way, a composite of these attributes might be highly 
desirable in nursing practice, but empathy and compassion are often conflated in nursing 
discourses.  A recent systematic review of the literature concluded that empathy is considered 
to be a moral attribute of compassionate care in nursing, along with wisdom, humanity and 
love (Blomberg et al. 2016).  Furthermore, the authors suggest that compassionate practice is 
mobilized through a composite of practices, expressed through a sort of ‘situational 
awareness’ of the nurses’ perceptions of the suffering of others: 
Setting up compassion in this manner firmly links it to participation of 
the nurse in responsive action that is aimed at relieving suffering and 
ensuring dignity, and which involves the nurse in some sort of 
participatory relationship in which the nurse exercises relational 
capacity through which empathy is experienced and a caring pastoral 
relationship is constructed. (Blomberg et al. 2016: 138, original 
emphasis) 
Despite seeming to be encompassed within these moral attributes that are central to nursing 
practice, in the standards set by the professional regulatory body for nurses and midwives in 
the UK, empathy is conspicuous by its absence.  Instead, empathy is hidden in the definition 
of ‘professionalism’ as a component of ‘person-centred practice’, brought about by practising 
autonomous ‘evidence-based nursing that respects and maintains dignity and human rights’ 
(Nursing and Midwifery Council 2014: 6).  Person-centred care marks a shift away from a 
hegemonic dichotomy between the physician and the object of their interventions – the 
patient – to an approach that places the person at the centre of the care that they receive from 
healthcare services (Bleakley 2014).  The approach is generally accepted as a way in which 
to take into account the individual’s perceptions, experiences, and desires in the design and 
process of their care and treatment plan (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2018).  In addition, 
it suggests a challenge of the dominant models of heroic individualism and professional 
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essentialism of medical practice to adopt a more collaborative model based on genuine 
acknowledgement and respect of difference (Bleakley 2014).  Person-centred care is often 
portrayed as an act of resistance to the binary dualisms that have pervaded medicine in 
particular, and scientific ideologies in general, for centuries.  As suggested by Ekman et al.: 
Person-centered care (PCC) is the antithesis of reductionism.  It asserts that 
patients are persons and should not be reduced to their disease alone, but 
rather that their subjectivity and integration within a given environment, 
their strengths, their future plans and their rights should also be taken into 
account.  (Ekman et al. 2011: 249) 
Empathy, however, is ambiguously entangled with all of these elements.  While empathy is 
considered to be a fundamental trait of nursing professionalism, at the same time, nurses must 
remember to be ‘impartial’, and keep these emotions at a distance.  This places the competent 
nurse in the difficult position of having to both maintain this distance while remembering to 
follow the tenets of patient-centred care, an ethos that insists on an anthropocentric model of 
care.  As such, this paradoxical positioning of empathy in the ecology of nursing practice is 
even more prominent in the simulation ecologies of nursing education.  How do nurse 
educators prepare nursing students to practise in a world where there is an expectation to 
provide person-centred care, positioning the human in the centre, in healthcare ecologies 
where the pedagogies are more-than-human hybrid simulations of human patients?  
Moreover, how can nurse educators enrol non-human objects, eidolons devoid of 
compassion, to teach nursing students how to express empathy for real human patients in 
practices that must keep person-centred care as their foundation?   
Performing the world of nursing practice into being  
As part of my doctoral research, the gathering of posthuman anecdotes (Adams and 
Thompson 2016) allowed me to tell the stories enacted in the complex, contentious and 
uncanny spaces of simulation education.  Enacting these ‘discursive creations’ allowed me to 
become attuned to the ‘lived affects and inescapable intensities’ of simulated human patient 
pedagogies: to ‘reassemble a resembling fiction’ (Adams and Thompson 2016: 33) of the 
multiple assemblages (Mol 2002) performed in this ecology.  This storytelling went further, 
however, as the posthuman interview questions in Heuristic 7 (Adams and Thompson 2016, 
74–75) guided me to reveal how the multiple sociomaterial assemblages of the simulated 
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human eidolon are ‘materially enacted’ (Mol 2002: 143, original emphasis) to allow the 
multiple worlds of nursing practice and education to hang together.  In addition, while these 
posthuman objects are partially connected between these multiple worlds, they were 
inevitably ordered and re-ordered by the interferences (Mol 2002) of other sociomaterial 
assemblages to be translated into other – different, yet connected – parallel worlds.  As such, 
these interview questions helped me to make visible how these posthuman objects become 
‘things manipulated in practices’ (Mol 2002: 4) to become multiple sociomaterial worlds 
(Adams and Thompson 2016).  The following anecdote is presented as an exemplar of how 
the heuristics were enacted in practice. 
Studying the practices enacted in the simulation lab 
A group of third-year nursing students are taking part in a full day of training in immediate 
life support skills.  They are approaching the end of their final year of the degree programme 
and will shortly be leaving to participate in their final practice placement before being signed 
off as fully qualified and registered nurses.  The training day comprises four intensive 
scenario-based simulation sessions combined with several shorter classroom sessions to 
instruct the students on the standard Immediate Life Support qualifications, designed and 
regulated by Resuscitation Council UK (2016), and which includes patient assessment, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and defibrillation techniques.  The students are continuously 
assessed on each outcome by multiple instructors and travel around four different stations 
throughout the day to ensure that they are assessed by four different instructors.  The 
instructors are all full-time members of the nursing lecturing staff at the two universities 
where the research took place, but the material presented here focuses on one in particular; 
Paul.  In the first session, the students are demonstrating their knowledge of the causes and 
prevention of cardiopulmonary arrest, including the standardized ABCDE (airway, breathing, 
circulation, disability, exposure) procedure, also known as an ‘algorithm’ (Resuscitation 
Council UK 2016).  Each of the scenarios enrols the SimManTM mannequin, a computerized 
simulated human patient (Figure 1).   
Becoming familiar with the uncanny mannequin/patient eidolon 
Six nursing students arrive in the simulated ward.  The mannequin is lying in a hospital bed, 
situated centrally in the room.  Paul welcomes them and explains what is expected of them; 
how they are going to practise what they have been learning in the previous classroom 
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lecture.  He splits them into two groups of three.  He introduces them to the patient, ‘Chris’.  
He describes why Chris has been admitted to the acute admissions ward, explaining the 
circumstances.   
Paul: This is Chris, he’s been taken in to the acute admissions ward this morning, 
there was a lot of snow overnight – did you not notice it, on your way in? 
 [Laughter] 
Even before the students encounter the mannequin/patient, the educator puts them at ease by 
facetiously relating the scenario to the weather.  It is mid-March in the UK, spring is 
imminent, and the weather has been unusually mild, so there is no snow at all, and the 
prospect of snowfall seems very unlikely.  
Paul: And, he’s been digging his car out of his drive and developed central chest 
pain.  Will you have a look at him for me? 
The three students approach the mannequin to begin the assessment, and one introduces 
herself to the patient/mannequin.  Here, Paul begins to enact the voice of the 
mannequin/patient by modifying his voice and speaking in a strong regional accent: 
Donna: Right, Chris, how are you feeling? 
Paul/Chris: ‘Terrible!  I’ve a pain in my chest.’  
The students discuss amongst themselves: 
Gemma: Right, so he’s talking. 
Donna: He’s talked. 
Gemma: This is a bit awkward. 
Paul: It is a bit awkward!  It is.  It’ll get easier, I promise!  Okay, so what does 
that tell you about Chris’ airway? 
The students seem to understand immediately that the voice of the patient is emanating from 
Paul; that it is not the simulated human patient that is speaking, but that Paul is performing 
the voice of ‘Chris’, the patient, and they play along with this imaginary practice.  However, 
9 
 
after ‘Chris’ responds, the students seem to be aware that it is acceptable practice, in this 
space, to immediately ignore what the patient has said, and instead, to talk amongst 
themselves about the patient, as though he were absent, although they do this quietly, 
hesitantly.  The students know that if the patient is talking, that it is unlikely that there is any 
obstruction of the airway.  In adhering to person-centred practice, they would not ignore the 
patient and voice this sort of opinion while the patient was conscious and speaking to them, 
but in this space, they turn their faces away from the patient/mannequin and consult amongst 
themselves in an enactment that is not normally permitted in practice.  This type of 
performance is acceptable here, however, because Paul has set the stage to give them 
permission to ‘act’ out of character, and to cross the acceptable bounds of nursing practice 
enactments.  The students express their discomfort with this trespass – ‘This is a bit 
awkward’ – and Paul uses repetition to reassure them that yes, this crossing of practice 
boundaries is, indeed, awkward, but that ‘it’ll get easier’.  The awkwardness, however, is 
ambiguous and multiple; the student may be referring to the discomfort of having to breach 
the limits of acceptable professional practice, or the awkwardness may also include the 
disquieting experience of having to encounter a simulated human patient – the uncanny 
double of a human patient.  Lemermeyer (this edition) also considers this strange relation 
between the students and the mannequin embodied in the tension of having to enrol the 
practices of a non-human object while at the same time demonstrating that they are capable 
of placing the human patient at the centre of their care practices.  
After providing reassurance, the educator quickly shifts focus: ‘Okay, so what does that tell 
you about Chris’ airway?’; pulling the attention sharply back from the enactment of 
acknowledging that this is a story, and placing the emphasis instead on the point of the 
lesson, while at the same time, modifying his voice back to his ‘teacher voice’ instead of that 
of ‘Chris’.  This oscillation between enactments can be considered multiple modes of 
mobilizing knowledge: Paul is simultaneously instructing the students about the types of 
enactments that are permissible in this space, while at the same time encouraging them to 
think about which cues the patient is giving them to provide an appropriate assessment of the 
patient.  These enactments, mediated by those of the mannequin, become a powerful mode of 
knowing, but also a double one: the students are learning how to assess the patient’s airway, 
while also learning how to perform the simulation of assessing the mannequin/patient’s 
airway.  At the same time, paradoxically, the tenets of person-centred care are pushed to the 
periphery in the human actors’ relations with the mannequin/patient. The students 
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temporarily abandon the ideals of person-centred care, understanding instinctively when it is 
acceptable to de-centre the patient and ignore them (and their desires) completely during the 
simulation learning encounter.   
Betraying the blood pressure readings 
The students move on to the ‘B’ (breathing) assessment, and then the ‘C’ (circulation) 
assessment.  As two students attempt to find Chris’ pulse, Paul is showing Mary how to find 
the blood pressure reading on the touch-screen monitor.  Mary asks Paul whether she should 
use the stethoscope to read the blood pressure manually, but Paul tells her, ‘You don’t need 
to.’ Paul shows her what to press on the monitor to allow the blood pressure values to be 
displayed.  There is an interesting absence here.  Mary has attached the blood pressure cuff to 
the mannequin’s arm, and she then retrieves the stethoscope so that she can take the blood 
pressure reading by listening for the pulse, but she knows that the sphygmomanometer is in 
no way connected to the monitor.  However, the blood pressure values have already been pre-
determined by some absent (other) actor in the assemblage, rendering her manual blood-
pressure reading skills redundant.  These values, pre-determined by the software program and 
the specific set of symptoms chosen for this scenario, remain hidden until Paul navigates to 
them, making them visible on the touch-screen monitor.  Here the practice that encompasses 
the skills of the student to check the blood pressure occupies a strange position.  It is an 
integral component in the practices of nursing students when this scenario might happen in 
actual practice.  At the same time, it is also missing and hidden from the practices that are 
being simulated in this assemblage.  Mary should already know how to manually check a 
patient’s blood pressure using a sphygmomanometer and stethoscope, but, for today’s 
simulation scenario, the mannequin/software assemblage enacts this practice, absolving her 
of this duty.   
This anecdote clearly illustrates how the unravelling translations heuristic (Adams and 
Thompson 2016: 76) is useful in revealing ‘the mechanism by which some entities come to 
control others’ – to manipulate practices and allow realities to multiply (Mol 2002).  Here, 
the practices of the mannequin/software assemblage have acted as an interference – or have 
translated – the enactment of reading the patient’s blood pressure values.  By assuming the 
role of blood pressure reader, the mannequin/software assemblage interferes with the student 
nurse’s repertoire of practices, mediating them, however slightly, so that they shift and ‘vary 
from one site to another’ (Mol 2002: 143).  As Callon and Law (1982) suggest, there is also 
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some element of loss, or traheson – betrayal – here.  While Mary must eventually learn how 
to correctly assess the patient’s blood pressure, the simulation education assemblage is 
disrupting this practice.  The pre-programmed blood pressure reading on the monitor is 
mediating the enactments of nursing practice – while Mary is learning how the 
mannequin/software displays the blood pressure reading, it may be at the cost of learning 
how to accurately perform a manual reading of a patient’s blood pressure in her future 
nursing practice.   
The mannequin/software assemblage becomes here what Latour calls a ‘mediator’ (Latour 
2005: 39).  In rendering redundant the practice of performing a reading of the blood pressure, 
this enactment becomes something else – not two different practices, or one practice divided 
into two, but multiple enactments that are ‘partially connected, more than one , and less than 
many’ (Mol 2002: 82).  The practice of taking a blood pressure reading in the parallel world 
of nursing practice is replicated in the simulation scenario to be as authentic as possible.  The 
two practices exist side by side, but, depending on where they are enacted and by which 
sociomaterial actors, they are transformed into another reality of that practice.  They are 
partially connected – they carry the same meaning – but it is the subtle differences in the 
ways in which the same practices are enacted by the new set of sociomaterial actors that 
introduces this new practice into the assemblage.  By absorbing the practice of reading the 
blood pressure values, the mannequin/software assemblage performs this new reality into 
being.  The student learns that, for the purposes of simulation learning at least, it is not 
important to check the authenticity of the blood pressure reading – the mannequin/software 
assemblage is enacting that practice.  In simulation education, then, the mannequin/software 
mediates the student nurse’s practice, bringing a new mode of knowing into being (Law 
2016) to allow the parallel worlds of nursing education and practice to hang together.  The 
unravelling translations heuristic (Adams and Thompson 2016) allows the researcher to 
become attuned to how the translation of these worlds can be considered enactments of 
multiple practices. 
Grieving for the undead eidolon 
Towards the end of the day, the students appear to be more confident in their immediate life 
skills practices and respond to the educator’s questions more competently.  Their CPR 
compressions become more efficient, as measured by the mannequin’s internal sensors, and 
they are working effectively in teams, mediated by the automated external defibrillator 
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(AED) machine, which keeps time, notifying them when the heart rate should be monitored 
in two-minute intervals.  For each scenario, the students manage to successfully resuscitate 
the mannequin/patient.   
However, at some point during the final session, the educator always prepares a scenario 
where the students will encounter an older patient who they will not be able to resuscitate.  
Paul sets the mannequin’s controls so that there is no pulse or breathing at all.  He asks two 
students to come forward and sets the scene:   
Paul: So, half-past four in the morning, night shift, and you need to 
check on Mr. Thomas here.  Mr. Thomas is a 79-year-old man, 
he’s been an in-patient for assessment for a couple of weeks 
now.  He’s been having problems with increasing confusion at 
home, and wandering.  So, usually, by this time of night, he’s 
been up for a wander to the toilet, and you’ve usually got to 
help him back to bed.  But he’s just not been up this night.  So, 
you go through to have a wee look.   
The two students approach the patient/mannequin.  Unable to rouse Mr. Thomas, they 
quickly follow the prescribed mnemonic algorithm, checking airway, breathing and 
circulation.  After determining that the patient/mannequin is unresponsive, they call for help 
and begin CPR.  As the scenario progresses, up to six students are participating in the 
resuscitation attempt, using the AED machine to assess the patient’s suitability for shock.  
After each two-minute circuit, no shock is advised, indicating that the heart is not beating.  
They continue CPR and the AED continues its intermittent analyses.  As they work, the 
educator quizzes the students on the factors that they should be considering; the reversible 
causes, the interventions they should be performing and the techniques they are using.  As the 
team begins to work well, alternating roles and responding appropriately to Paul’s questions, 
the educator provides some more background to the patient’s history, building up more of an 
understanding of the patient’s condition:   
Paul:   So, he’s on regular paracetamol, and breakthrough pain is 
managed with dihydrocodeine for his arthritis.  A betablocker 
and an ACE inhibitor for a bit of heart failure, and he’s on a 
statin at night, and he’s on a bit of quetiapine because, 
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particularly at night time, he gets a bit confused, agitated and 
wanders, and, for breakthrough, he has had the occasional 
haloperidol, and he’s also on Aricept, for dementia.    
 He’s been in for a fortnight, the family have been increasingly 
concerned.  He was living alone after the death of his wife, and often 
found outside wandering in the street.  There’s increasing concern that 
he’s not going to be fit to go home and be safe at home, so they’ve been 
looking for more long-term care for him.  The family live about a 
hundred miles away, so are not in a position to take him in.  So, we’ve 
now been going for … let’s say, 20 minutes.   
While continuing to care for their patient/mannequin, making chest compressions and 
administering medication, the students debate whether they should continue with CPR.  In 
every group, they first discuss whether they are allowed to make such a decision, and the 
educator tells them that they are the team responsible for the patient, that they know the 
patient best, and, in the absence of any medical staff, they might have to make such a 
decision in their own future practices.  The students discuss the patient/mannequin’s quality 
of life, the damage they may have caused to his body, and the implications of his brain 
having been starved of oxygen for an undetermined period before they found him.  It takes 
several circuits of CPR/AED before they eventually stop. 
Paul: So, it is hard to stop.  And you do feel deflated by it, but what positives 
can you take from it? 
Student: You’re giving him the man his dignity. You’re not causing any further 
trauma to him.   
In all of the sessions I observed, without exception, the students continue to care for the 
‘dead’ mannequin/patient as though it were a real person.  They move the mannequin’s arms 
and legs into a resting position, stroke its hands, remove the AED contacts and other 
equipment, and cover the patient/mannequin gently with a sheet, continuing to provide 
compassionate care, despite the scenario having finished and despite the patient/mannequin 
having died.  Attending to the patient after death is an example of a taken-for-granted 
practice that all nurses must learn, as Lemermeyer (this issue) also observes in her paper.  On 
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several occasions, the students are moved to tears, flooded with the grief of losing someone 
in their care, regardless of the brevity of their relationship.  In the interview with the 
educator, I asked him how the mannequin was implicated in teaching the students about these 
moral attributes in these scenarios: 
These guys are going out into practice, so they need to know the reality … 
and it’s a chance to reinforce that resuscitation is highly likely to be 
unsuccessful because you’re having to re-start them rather than stabilize 
someone, and there’s a high likelihood of non-success, there’s a chance to 
reinforce that it’s not like you see on telly, on some of these medical soaps 
where almost every resuscitation is successful, but plus tap into the 
compassion, the empathy, the moral/ethical dilemmas that resuscitation 
throws up, because the DNA/CPR framework, that’s all pertinent.  
Here, the educator indicates the importance of the mannequin/patient in embodying the 
‘reality’ of resuscitation practices, the moral and ethical dilemmas they raise and the practices 
that nurses must enrol to tackle them: empathy and compassion. 
Mannequins, fidelity and simulacra 
In medical education, the ideals and values that medical students bring with them when they 
begin their programme gradually deplete in a process of disillusionment and cynicism as ‘the 
realities of doctoring kick in’ in a phenomenon described as ‘empathy decline’ (Bleakley 
2014: 5).  Some suggest that issues related to empathy decline are not being addressed by 
current training approaches that rely on simulation pedagogies, and that medical students may 
have ‘both idealism and compassion ‘trained out’ of them by their medical education’ 
(Bleakley 2014: 59–60, citing Kumagai 2008, 2009).  This undesired consequence of medical 
education was first revealed in the 1960s, but more recent works suggest that these issues 
persist and that current communication skills training models that favour simulation 
pedagogies do not resolve them (Bleakley 2014).  Bleakley (2014) also explores the widely-
held belief in medical folklore that empathy is not a skill but a virtue, which prompted him to 
critically explore the concept of ‘professionalism’ in relation to patient-centred care; ‘the set 
of dispositions and practices that make up the ‘non-technical’ face of medicine’ (Bleakly 
2014: 15).  It is ironic, then, that the very technical practices of simulated human patient 
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education that are often enrolled to teach technical or procedural skills are also the very same 
practices that mobilize knowledge about these very ‘non-technical’ attributes. 
While the ‘realism’ of the mannequins seems to be the aim for some, others argue that 
‘realism is only a means to achieve the goal of creating learning opportunities for 
participants’ (Dieckmann and Krage 2013) and should not be a goal in and of itself.  Critique 
of ‘the fascination with seductive high-fidelity simulation realized through sophisticated 
technology’ (Bligh and Bleakley 2006: 606) has challenged the assumption that employing 
technology to attempt to reproduce the human body and has questioned the wholesale 
adoption of simulation pedagogies without engaging in meaningful debate on the ontological 
and epistemological implications of this teaching and learning ecology.  For example, 
Johnson (2008) argues that, in designing the human patient simulators to be as ‘real’ as 
possible, it is not actually the human body that is being simulated.  Instead, she suggests, it is 
only the representation of the knowledge of the body learned in clinical practice: simulation 
is a representation of those practices, not a representation of the human body.  This creates, in 
the practices of the mannequin, a hybrid of multifaceted clinical practice experience situated 
within a complex technological simulated human body, enacting the effect of producing a 
contradictory and uncanny space in which learning to care is mobilized.  However, the 
dichotomy between the real and what is simulated may not be important in the nurse 
educator’s practices here.  Instead of mobilizing learning about ‘false’ embodiments of 
nursing practice, the educator is, by enrolling the interferences enacted by these material 
entanglements, enacting ‘different versions’ (Burbules 2004: 172, original emphasis) of these 
realities as fundamental modes of knowing for the students’ future nursing practices. 
The elusive patient in the simulation of patient-centred care 
The issues raised in this paper are directly related to those that claim to be central to clinical 
practice and education: that healthcare professionals should provide patient-centred care, as 
‘the NHS aspires to put patients at the heart of everything it does’ (National Health Service 
2015: n.pag.).  In nursing education, a direct link has been made between the use of 
simulation in clinical practice education and patient safety, stating that it must be used as a 
method to ‘test the skills required to sign off students safely’ (Nursing and Midwifery 
Council 2010: 9).  However, while the most recent standards state that ‘effective simulation 
facilitates safety by enhancing knowledge, behaviours and skills’ (Nursing and Midwifery 
Council 2019: 1), the prioritising of patient safety in simulation education somewhat 
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undermines the importance of using these same attributes for providing person-centred care.  
Johnson (2008) puts forth some very valid and appropriate challenges to the idea that the 
patient is situated at the centre of clinical education and questions the theoretical foundations 
of the role that simulation plays in conveying this knowledge.  Crucially, and, perhaps most 
importantly, Johnson (2008) highlights the most hidden of actors within the clinical 
simulation domain in summarising her observations: 
Acknowledging the fundamental aspects of practice in simulator 
development creates the discursive space to ask whose practice is being 
simulated: Experts?  Which experts?  Which medical professionals are 
being made invisible?  And what about patients?  I ask this last question 
because, in the work constellations of developers, designers and medical 
experts who cooperate in the tasks of simulator design and testing, the 
patient’s experience of a medical practice is not merely silenced or made 
invisible, it is never even considered. (Johnson 2008: 124) 
Johnson’s (2008) observation clearly illustrates how the mannequin, in mediation with those 
who design its working mechanisms and software applications, and with those who 
endeavour to teach, and to learn, by enacting the practices of simulation education, are 
forcing human patients into the periphery by excluding them in the design of human patient 
simulators.  Even as the medical educators attempt to promote person-centred care by placing 
the patient/mannequin in the centre of their practices, they interfere with these practices by 
deflecting the enactment of the patient in this parallel world (Mol 2002) away from the 
teaching and learning assemblage.  In their attempt at practising person-centred care, by 
barring the patient from engaging with the practices of the simulation assemblage, they are 
dissolving the very relations that they endeavour to make durable.  In contrast, the nurse 
educators in my research, by enrolling the parallel realities of their past experiences of caring 
for patients in their material enactments with the mannequin/patient, perform another reality 
into being – one that allowed the educator to move knowledge from one reality (nursing 
practice) to another (simulation education) and to become something else.  Something 
different but ‘partially connected’ (Mol 2002: 82) that allows these multiple worlds to hang 
together.  
Hopwood draws on the concepts of hyperreality and simulacra (Baudrillard 1981, 1983) to 
challenge the assumption that the real danger in simulation education is that ‘it is only ever 
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imagined versions of reality that provide the reference’ (Hopwood 2017: 69).  He argues that 
the aim of simulation settings and scenarios should not be to enact an exact replica of nursing 
practice: ‘[i]t is less about whether learners perform in pre-specified ways, and more about 
how they are changed through the experience, and how the experience changes what they do 
in future’ (Hopwood 2017: 70).  Here, Hopwood (2017) proposes the same solution that the 
participant in this praxiography did – that it is not about the fidelity of the simulations, ‘it’s 
about what you do with them’ (Paul, Interview).  It is about how the practices of the nurse 
educators, in their hybrid assemblages with the mannequin and the multiple parallel worlds of 
nursing practice, are enrolled in the mediation of these practices to perform the modes of 
knowing of nursing practice.  The embodiment of nursing practice, in the enactments of the 
mannequin, are indeed simulacra.  However, in enrolling the practices that themselves are 
implicit in enacting the simulacrum into being, the nurse educators capitalize on this uncanny 
othering of the real human body to instead perform a powerful mode of knowing that allows 
the nursing education assemblage to hang together.  As Hopwood writes; 
By embracing the unreal, and fluid play between real and imaginary, 
simulacra can not only draw from worlds of clinical practice and pedagogy, 
but can infect them. A pedagogically rich moment can unfold and be 
exploited for all its unreal, fake, and fictional qualities (Hopwood 2017: 78)   
Indeed, it is not the parallel world of real clinical practice that shapes the modes of knowing 
that are enacted in simulation education in these anecdotes; instead, it is the enactments of the 
educator/mannequin/patient that do.  It is the assemblage of each of these enactments in 
practice, and their connections with the nursing practice world, regardless of how partial they 
may be, that allows the knowledge of real clinical practice to become mobilized.  Rather than 
being hyperreal or simulacra, the multiple enactments of each of the actors in this 
assemblage, the social and the material, perform multiple enactments of clinical practice that 
allow these future realities to hang together.  As such, these pedagogies have what 
Rosenberger describes as ‘the potential for simulation to go beyond the real-world’ 
(Rosenberger 2011: 220) to enact multiple realities by breaking down the false dichotomy 
between the ‘real’ and the ‘simulated’.   
Being guided by the interview questions posed in the ‘unravelling translations’  heuristic 
proposed by Adams and Thompson (2016: 74) allowed me to become attuned to the practices 
of nurse educators as they navigated these infections and interferences between practices in 
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simulation learning ecology to mobilize knowledge of nursing practice.  In addition, by 
enacting a posthuman inquiry of the educators’ enrolling of the simulated human patients, 
these heuristics allowed me to make visible how the enactments of this digital object 
mediated, and were mediated by, the educator’s practices.  In attempting to enact multiple 
realities in one space (the real, the pretend, the actual), they are, in a sense, embodying what 
these particular interview questions set out to do – to reveal how objects and practices 
assemble, through a form of mediation, to connect these multiple worlds and bring different, 
but partially connected sociomaterial realities into being.  The mannequin, then, in its 
constellation of relations with the educator, the students, the patient stories, the educator’s 
experiences, the students’ experiences, and myriad hidden digital actants, mediates the 
enactments of nursing practice.  These enactments are not imaginary, nor are they real; they 
are something else besides, something that is situated somewhere between reality and fiction 
(Law 2006).  Law emphasizes that ‘all representation also betrays its object’ (Law 2006: 47).  
In the same way, placing all of the emphasis on the ‘fidelity’ of the human body in simulation 
education betrays and diminishes the importance of the imaginary in this complex 
assemblage.  However, the nurse educators in this research resist the disruptive interference 
of betrayal by enrolling the mannequin/patient in these parallel worlds of fiction.  
Multiple posthuman assemblages 
The posthuman anecdotes (Adams and Thompson 2016) presented here offer an example of 
how the enactments of digital objects might be made ‘visible, audible, tangible, knowable’ 
(Mol 2002: 33) by analysing them by following a series of heuristics.  These include 
interview questions that help attune us to ‘listening to things, observing them in action, 
discerning their co-constitutive influences’ (Adams and Thompson 2016: 18) to reveal how 
the practices enacted here can ‘evoke both past doings and future imaginings, translating 
what has come before and translating what might unfold next’ (Adams and Thompson 2016: 
75).  Together, my engagement with these heuristics generated another, different, but 
connected, mode of knowing, in revealing how practice knowledge is mobilized in simulated 
human patient pedagogies.  During the course of this praxiographic research, these 
enactments revealed that there is a paradoxical relationship between simulating human bodies 
and teaching people to care for human beings.  Placing the importance of these very human 
‘moral attributes’, such as compassion, empathy, wisdom, humanity and love, at the centre of 
caring for real human beings seems to stand in direct conflict with the enrolling of 
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computerized simulated human patients to teach these qualities.  How, then, might a 
sensibility for patient-centred care be mobilized in spaces where the posthuman assemblages 
of human educator and non-human pedagogies are in constant flux? 
Braidotti (2013: 190) writes how, in attempting to overcome humanism, ‘to be posthuman 
does not mean to be indifferent to humans, or to be de-humanized.  On the contrary, it rather 
implies a new way of combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of 
community’.  Rejecting universalism, she suggests, the human–technological interaction has 
shifted towards ‘an egalitarian blurring of differences’ (p. 109), bringing about a strong sense 
of inter-connection between self and others, including non-human others, and relationality 
that transcends negativity and creates conditions for mobilizing hidden possibilities for future 
‘sustainable becoming or qualitative transformations of the negativity or injustice of the 
present’ (Braidotti 2013: 192).  Ironically, then, in our human/non-human assemblages, in 
our becoming more-than-human, or posthuman, we become ‘better’, more human(e), 
humans.  More human than human, perhaps.   
The posthuman, post-anthropocentric practices, privileging neither the social nor the material, 
embody both the actual and virtual, and make indistinguishable the real from the imaginary, 
the outside indistinguishable from the inside, and the human indistinguishable from the non-
human.  Similarly, the posthuman analysis performed here, by enrolling the gathering 
anecdotes and unravelling translations heuristics to interview digital objects (Adams and 
Thompson 2016), shows how the educators themselves unravel and challenge the ubiquitous 
notion that the patient is, and should, always be in the centre.  In this sense, it may also be 
possible to be critical of centring the human in educational research for whose topic of 
interest is the teaching of the very enactment of centring the human.  Enrolling these 
heuristics revealed that it is the hybrid posthuman practices of the nurse educators that act as 
mediators to deflect the treacherous effects of the translation of the real human body into a 
simulated one.  It is the nurse educators’ enactments of the multiple realities of nursing 
practice, in an assemblage of these multiple realities and the imaginary tales of simulation 
education, that allow the nursing education assemblage to hang together. Thus, the 
knowledge of nursing practice is mobilized. 
Throughout Blade Runner (Scott 1982), various ethical and moral questions are 
contemplated: what it is to be human and do simulated humans have the right to live; who has 
authority over their engineered memories, and is it possible for replicants to develop empathy 
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and compassion?  These questions are doubly pertinent for Deckard, as, in several scenes, the 
cinematography seems to suggest that he himself is a replicant, but one who possesses the 
capacity for compassion for others; an ambiguity that has troubled audiences since the film’s 
original release and beyond.  At the film’s climax, Deckard battles with Roy, one of the 
remaining replicants he must retire, on the rooftops of the tall buildings.  In a cliff-hanging 
scene, Deckard jumps between buildings and falls, clinging to the edge of the roof while Roy 
looms over him.  Just as Deckard loses his grip, in a final act of compassion, Roy catches 
Deckard’s wrist and pulls him up to safety before meeting his pre-programmed ‘failsafe’ self-
destruct ‘termination’ death, suggesting that the replicants may have developed a capacity for 
empathy.  In sparing Deckard’s (maybe human) life, Roy (a nonhuman) can perhaps be seen 
to be more human(e) than human.   
Just as the replicants in Blade Runner (Scott 1982) were able to develop the capacity for 
empathy in their hybrid assemblages with their bioengineered human-ness, it might be 
suggested that the nurse educators, in their posthuman relations with SimManTM, are able to 
mobilize knowledge about how to care for other human beings with compassion and empathy 
in more-than-human ways. 
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